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Abstract—The World Wide Web (Web) provides access to a
global space of information assets and computational services.
It also, however, serves as a platform for social interaction
(e.g., Facebook) and participatory involvement in all manner of
online tasks and activities (e.g., Wikipedia). There is a sense,
therefore, that the advent of the Social Web has transformed our
understanding of the Web. In addition to viewing the Web as a
form of information repository, we are now able to view the Web
in more social terms. In particular, it has become possible to see
the Web as providing access to the human social environment.
This is important, because issues of social embedding and social
interaction have been seen to contribute to the emergence of
human cognitive capabilities. The ability of the Web to provide
access to the human social environment thus raises an important
question: Can humanity play a productive role in the emergence
of advanced forms of machine intelligence by virtue of their
interactions and engagements with the online realm? The present
paper attempts to show why this question is worth asking. It also
attempts to highlight some of the ways in which Web-based forms
of contact with the human social environment may be relevant
to research into machine intelligence.
Index Terms—social web; social intelligence; language; ma-
chine intelligence; machine learning.
I. INTRODUCTION
The World Wide Web (Web) is a technology that was created
by humanity, and its implications for humanity—e.g., its effects
on human cognitive and social processes—are, to a large extent,
the primary focus of our current interest and concern [1]. Such
a preoccupation is, of course, perfectly understandable. It is
natural for us to wonder (and sometimes worry) about the
implications of the Web for our species, especially when it
comes to the effect of the Web on our cognitive capabilities.
For such capabilities are the hallmark of our species: it is
our cognitive profile that sets us apart from other forms of
terrestrial life, and it is such capabilities that enable us (and
only us) to actively shape the course of our cognitive destiny—
to engineer something like the Web, and then worry about its
cognitive consequences.
The present paper attempts to approach the Web from
a somewhat different perspective. Rather than attempt to
consider the implications of the Web for future forms of
human intelligence, it aims to consider the implications of
the Web for future forms of machine intelligence. In order to
lay the foundation for this appraisal, it is important that we
first recognize the status of the Web as a social environment,
or at least as an environment that provides an important form
of informational contact with the human social environment.
Such a claim is unlikely to require much in the way of a
detailed defence. There can be little doubt that the Web has
come to play a significant role in supporting all manner of
social activities and processes. One need only reflect on the
popularity of systems such as Facebook, Instagram, Twitter
and Snapchat to appreciate the status of the Web as a form
of social technology, i.e., as a technology that can be used
to support and enable various forms of social interaction and
engagement. This does not mean, however, that the social
significance of the Web is exhausted by systems that support
human–human communication. Beyond the social networking
and instant messaging systems, we thus encounter a rich array
of systems where issues of social participation are of paramount
importance. These include systems that rely on large-scale
social participation to yield substantive bodies of online content
(e.g., Wikipedia). It also includes so-called human computation
systems [2], which rely on social participation for the purposes
of completing computationally difficult or intractable tasks. In
general, the contemporary Web is dominated by an array of
systems that enable human users to generate, edit and organize
online content. Such systems are, of course, the familiar socio-
technical denizens of what we now refer to as the Social Web.
Why should the social properties of the Web, however we
choose to define them, be of any interest or relevance to the
emergence of advanced forms of machine intelligence? To
answer this question, it will help to introduce two substantive
strands of empirical and theoretical research: one focused on the
evolution of human intelligence, the other, on the ontogenetic
development of human cognitive capabilities.
Evolutionary matters first. Humans, it should be clear, are
prodigious cognizers, capable of traversing cognitive terrains
that other organisms seem congenitally ill-equipped to navigate.
What is it that explains this remarkable difference between
ourselves and every other species that has inhabited Planet
Earth? Surely not the properties of the physical environment
in which we are embedded; for we are not alone in having
to cope with the problems the physical world throws at
us. An alternative possibility is that our particular form of
intelligence is tied to the properties of the social environment
in which we are embedded. It is thus the peculiar features
of the human social environment that best explains the
evolutionary emergence of the human mind. This idea actually
comes in a variety of flavours, including the social brain
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hypothesis [3], the machiavellian intelligence hypothesis [4], the
cultural intelligence hypothesis [5], and the social intelligence
hypothesis [6]. The specific details of these hypotheses need
not concern us here; what is important, for present purposes,
is simply the idea that a considerable body of work associates
the evolutionary emergence of human intelligence with the
peculiar properties of the human social environment.
The importance of the human social environment has also
been highlighted by work that seeks to explain the development
of human cognitive capabilities. “[S]ociality,” it has been
suggested, “lies at the heart of cognitive development” [7,
p. 7]. This is a view whose lineage can be traced to the work
of the Soviet psychologist, Lev Vygotsky. Vygotsky argued that
it is the nature of our interaction with socially-significant others
that holds the key to understanding human cognition (see [8]).
In the absence of our ability to interact and engage with other
human agents, we would, Vygotsky suggests, be unable to
acquire the sorts of abilities that are the hallmark of human
cognizing. Similar sentiments are expressed by those who
emphasize the importance of enculturation to human cognitive
development. Tomasello [9], for example, suggests that:
...if a human child were raised from birth outside
of human contact and culture, without exposure to
human artifacts or communal activities of any kind,
that child would develop few of the cognitive skills
that make human cognition so distinctive... [9, p. 359]
The general idea, then, is that a capacity for social interaction,
and an ability to exploit the products of human culture, are
of crucial importance when it comes to understanding the
distinctive shape of the human cognitive economy. Once we
combine this idea with the earlier claim regarding the role of
the human social environment in human cognitive evolution,
it is easy to see how the putative social properties of the
Web might pique the interests of the machine intelligence
community. For inasmuch as we accept the claim that the Web
affords an unprecedented form of access to the human social
environment, then it seems that we are provided with a novel
opportunity to expand the cognitive repertoire of systems that
inhabit the online realm. The argumentative basis for this claim
is as follows:
P1: The Web provides an important form of contact with
the human social environment.
P2: The development of human intelligence is tied to
the fact that we are socially-situated agents that are
embedded within the human social environment.
C1: The Web is poised to play a productive role in the
emergence of advanced forms of machine intelligence
by virtue of the kind of contact it provides with the
human social environment.
The present paper aims to marshal support for the claim
that the Web provides an important form of contact with the
human social environment. It also attempts to highlight some
of the ways in which such forms of contact may be relevant to
research into machine intelligence. The paper makes no attempt
to evaluate the extent to which the (contemporary) Web is able
to yield actual advances in machine intelligence—such efforts
must, of course, await the results of empirical research. Instead,
the aim of the present paper is more to identify a number of
avenues for future research and explain why such avenues are
worth pursuing.
II. THE HUMAN CLOUD
Elizabeth Shaw: How do you...? How do you know that?
David: I watched your dreams.
—Prometheus, 20th Century Fox, 2012
As the Web has developed, it has yielded an unprecedented
form of access to the human social environment. The Social
Web has, of course, played a particularly important role in
this transition. With the advent of social networking sites,
microblogging services, and media sharing systems, the online
environment seems to afford ever-deeper insights into the
dynamics of human social behavior [10]. Beyond this, however,
the Web is a technology that has become deeply embedded
in society, playing a crucial (and sometimes indispensable)
role in all manner of social activities and processes. In the
extreme case, such forms of socio-entanglement may lead to
the conclusion that the Web has become an intrinsic part of
society—part of the physical machinery that (at least in part)
realizes a rich array of social processes (see [11]).
When we look at the Web through human eyes, what we
see is a global space of networked information assets and
computational resources. It is a space of almost unimaginable
scale and complexity. But now imagine that you are a machine
agent that is embedded in this space. From this new perspective,
you can see yourself, perhaps, as having access to the social
environment in which we—us humans agents—live. It is,
perhaps, an imperfect form of access—you only see the digital
shadows of the human agents that inhabit the offline world.
But it is arguably a form of access, nevertheless.
As a means of helping to effect this shift of perspective,
consider the claim that our current arsenal of Internet-enabled
devices—our phones, watches, tablets and so on—serve as
bidirectional ‘plug points’ [12]. In one sense, such devices
enable us to ‘plug into’ the online environment, typically for
the purposes of pursuing some cognitive, social or epistemic
objective. In another sense, however, these devices also enable
the machines of the online world to plug into us! We are thus
the resources that exist at the edge of the Web, just as (from
our human perspective) it is the machines that are available at
the end of an HTTP request.
Such forms of bidirectional contact lie at the heart of what
has been referred to as the “human cloud” [13]. The human
cloud, in this case, is the human counterpart of the conventional
‘cloud’, i.e., the suite of online resources and services that
are the typical targets of cloud computing initiatives [14]. In
essence, the notion of the human cloud encourages us to see the
human social environment as a kind of computational resource—
one that can be used to assist with certain kinds of information
processing activity and (perhaps) the storage of certain kinds
of information. A number of engineering efforts are relevant to
this cloud-based view of the human social environment. Such
efforts include the use of service-oriented protocols to discover
and access human agents [15], the extension of traditional Web
service description languages to accommodate the possibility of
human involvement [15], and the emergence of programming
frameworks that are specifically geared to deliver “complex
computation systems incorporating large crowds of networked
humans and machines” [16, p. 124].
The concept of the human cloud is important because it
helps to highlight some of the ways in which machine-based
systems can draw on the human social environment as a means
of solving certain kinds of problem. Thus just as we humans
rely on the online environment to support our problem-solving
efforts, so too, perhaps, we can see machine-based systems as
‘tapping’ into the human cloud as a means of bolstering their
‘cognitive’ performance profiles. In some cases, such forms of
socio-technical coupling can be seen to yield hybrid problem-
solving organizations whose computational capabilities surpass
those of their constituent (human and machine) elements. The
forms of socio-technical entanglement that are enabled by the
Web thus provide a range of novel opportunities to support
large-scale problem-solving efforts that combine the distinctive
strengths (and perhaps weaknesses) of both human agents and
conventional computational systems [2][17][18].
There is, however, another point that is worth mentioning
here. It relates to the way in which various forms of human–
machine interaction can play a productive role in extending the
reach of machine-based cognitive capabilities. By reaching out
to the human cloud, for example, resources that were previously
too ill-structured to support machine learning can sometimes
be transformed into something that is much better aligned with
the requirements of machine learning algorithms. Consider, for
example, the way in which the addition of descriptive tags
and annotations to a set of image resources can assist with the
development of automated image classification (machine vision)
systems [19]. Such possibilities are explicitly recognized by
those who seek to engage human subjects in computationally-
difficult tasks. With respect to citizen science systems, for
example, Lintott and Reed [20] note that one of the limiting
factors in the development of automated processing solutions
is the availability of sufficiently well-structured training data
sets, and that one of the key advantages of citizen science
projects is the provision of such data sets. Similarly, when it
comes to a class of systems known as Games With A Purpose
(GWAPs), von Ahn and Dabbish [21] are keen to stress the role
of human contributions in giving rise to evermore intelligent
(and human-like) forms of machine-based processing:
By leveraging the human time spent playing games
online, GWAP game developers are able to capture
large sets of training data that express uniquely
human perceptual capabilities. This data can con-
tribute to the goal of developing computer programs
and automated systems with advanced perceptual or
intelligence skills. [21, p. 67]
III. LEARNING FROM EXPERIENCE
Roy Batty: If only you could see what I’ve seen with your eyes!
—Blade Runner, Warner Bros., 1982
The concept of the human cloud helps to highlight the status
of the human social environment as a form of complementary
computational resource—one that can be used to circumvent
the limitations of more conventional forms of (silicon-based)
computational processing. This is clearly important when
it comes to our ability to support novel kinds of problem-
solving organization. However, it also serves as a reminder
that human agents are the locus of particular forms of skill and
expertise that are often grounded in the extensive experience
we have with particular domains. It is here that the Web
provides us with an opportunity to extend the reach of machine-
based capabilities. The basic idea is that the Web can be
used as a form of social observatory—one which enables
machines to observe the human social environment and acquire
information about various forms of human competence. From
this perspective, the Web can be seen to support a particular
form of social learning: it enables us to treat the human social
environment as a source of information and knowledge that can
be mined and monitored in order to reduce the ‘experiential
gap’ that otherwise limits the cognitive and epistemic reach of
intelligent systems.
To help us understand this claim in a little more detail,
consider the effort to develop self-driving cars. Such efforts
clearly depend on advances in our ability to engineer sophisti-
cated forms of information processing, especially in the visual
domain. However, they also rely on advanced control systems
that are able to respond in an intelligent manner to a multitude
of road-relevant situations. In order to emulate the behavior of
human road users, it thus seems important to capture some of
the knowledge that human drivers have acquired as a result of
their experience behind the wheel. Such experience underlies
our ability to anticipate the likely behavior of other road users,
our ability to behave appropriately at an intersection, our ability
to adjust our driving behavior given specific meteorological
conditions, and so on. An experienced human driver thus
embodies a wealth of knowledge and experience that is clearly
pertinent to the design of autonomous vehicles, and this is
especially so if (as seems likely) we encounter a transitional
era in which self-driving vehicles must share the road with
human-driven vehicles.
How do we go about building cars that possess the behavioral
competence and road-related savoir faire exhibited by the
typical human driver? One option is to enlist the use of
conventional knowledge elicitation techniques [22] in order to
create formal models of the relevant body of human knowledge.
The problem with this approach is that it is likely to require
substantial time and effort, especially when one considers the
complexity of the target domain and the diversity of driving
practices exhibited by both individuals and cultural groups
(consider the norms and conventions that appear to characterize
the behavior of British and Italian drivers!).
Here is another approach: track the behavior of human-driven
vehicles as they move around the road network and attempt to
extract and formalize interesting regularities from the resultant
body of ‘experiential data’. Such data sets are likely to be
particularly valuable in cases where it is possible to track
the precise behavior of vehicles at particular locations, such
as at an intersection, a roundabout or a notorious black spot.
Additional value comes from the ability to track other kinds of
information, such as the use of driver signalling mechanisms
(e.g., the use of indicators and headlights) and information
about prevailing meteorological conditions (e.g., the presence
of fog).
The main point of this example is that it helps us see how a
particular form of access to the human social environment
can provide insight into bodies of experientially-grounded
knowledge, some of which may be relevant to the attempt
to engineer intelligent systems. The vision is thus one in which
advanced forms of machine intelligence come about as the
result of a deliberate attempt to monitor and learn from the
human social environment. According to this vision, machine
intelligence is, in some sense, parasitic on human experience:
it relies on the experience that humans have in order to short-
circuit the acquisition of particular forms of cognitive and
behavioral competence.
It is here that we encounter an interesting point of contact
with research in the Web Science community. For inasmuch
as we accept the idea that the Web provides access to the
human social environment, then it seems that we should be
able to mine the Web for certain kinds of knowledge. This is
the general idea behind a body of work that goes under the
heading of experiential knowledge mining [23]. Experiential
knowledge mining is defined as “the process of acquiring
experiential knowledge, as opposed to a priori knowledge,
from a variety of multimedia sources that describe human
experiences of various sorts” [23, p. 33]. In a Web context,
such forms of knowledge acquisition aim to shed light on
(among other things) the norms and conventions that surround
particular patterns of human behavior. A similar sort of claim
is sometimes encountered in the nascent sub-discipline of
computational social science [10]. In this case, the Web is seen
to provide an unprecedented opportunity to learn about the
human social environment, enabling us to acquire the sorts of
insights that other approaches may be unable to provide.
IV. ACTIVE LEARNING
Caleb: Did you program her to flirt with me?
Nathan: If I did, would that be cheating?
—Ex Machina, Universal Pictures, 2015
We have seen that the Web provides us with an unprecedented
opportunity to observe the human social environment (or at
least aspects thereof). But the notion of the Web as a form
of social observatory comes with an attendant risk. The risk
is that we lose sight of the way in which online systems
can play an active role in shaping the course of their own
cognitive development. When we view the Web as a form
of social observatory, there is a danger that we see machines
as the purely passive observers of some distant and perhaps
impervious social realm. This is a highly impoverished view
of social learning, and it is one that seems at odds with the
profile of human learning.
There is, however, no reason why we should restrict ourselves
to this purely passive view of machine learning. There are,
in fact, a number of ways in which we can view machines
as playing a more active role in the learning process. One
example of this comes from work into what is conveniently
called active learning [24]. Active learning is a form of machine
learning in which the machine attempts to actively intervene
in the learning process, structuring its training experiences in
a manner that yields the best learning outcome. Such forms
of active intervention have been shown to yield a number of
pedagogical pay-offs. For example, active learning has been
shown to improve the efficiency of the learning process by
reducing the number of training examples that are required to
reach near-optimal levels of performance [25].
A good example of active learning in a Web context is
provided by Barrington et al. [26]. Barrington et al. describe
the use of an online game, called Herd It, in which groups of
human individuals annotate a musical resource with descriptive
tags. These annotations are used to train a supervised machine
learning system that ultimately aims to perform the annotation
task independently of the human agents. All this, of course,
is broadly in line with the general shape of machine learning
methods. But what makes Barrington et al.’s system of
particular interest is the way in which the machine actively
directs the course of its own learning. It does this by actively
selecting the musical resources that will be the focus of future
tagging efforts by the human game players. This is important,
because it gives the machine an opportunity to select those
forms of feedback that are likely to be of greatest value
relative to its subsequent cognitive development. In the words
of Barrington et al. [26], “the machine learning system actively
directs the annotation games to collect new data that will most
benefit future model iterations” (p. 6411).
A consideration of active learning thus expands our under-
standing of the forms of contact that the Web provides with the
human social environment. Rather than seeing the Web simply
as a form of social observatory—one that permits a largely
passive form of observational contact with humanity—we can
now entertain a more active (and interactive) view of the Web.
On this view, the Web provides machines with an opportunity
to structure their contact with the human social environment,
enabling machines to influence human behavior in a manner
that befits the demands of a particular cognitive task.
V. THE GIFT OF LANGUAGE
Louise: It’s not a weapon, it’s a gift—their language.
—Arrival, Paramount Pictures, 2016
Given that much of the content of the Web is expressed in
the form of natural language, it is perhaps unsurprising that
the advent of the Web has led to something of a renaissance
in language-related computational research. Such interest is
evidenced by research into Natural Language Processing
(NLP) (e.g., [27]), information extraction [28], and sentiment
analysis [29]. It is also evidenced by the effort to develop
various forms of language-enabled agents, i.e., computational
agents that are able to exhibit proficiency in the use of
natural language expressions. This includes work relating to
so-called social bots [30], chatbots [31] and conversational
agents [32]. The reason for this renewed interest in language-
related technologies is, at least in part, due to the wealth of
linguistic content that is available in the online realm. Such
content provides us with a substantive body of empirical data
that can be used to inform large-scale analytic efforts. It should
also be clear that the Web has transformed the incentives that
drive research and development in this area—consider, for
example, the potential use of Twitter feeds as a means of
predicting the outcome of political elections [33].
How does this renewed interest in linguistic analysis impact
the present discussion on machine intelligence? The most
obvious answer to this question is that machines will become
increasingly proficient in understanding human language, and
as a result of this understanding, they will be better placed to
exploit our orthographic contributions to the online realm (e.g.,
they will have an improved ability to distil information and
knowledge from resources such as Wikipedia, Twitter, Facebook
and so on). It should also be clear that enhancements in
linguistic proficiency often go hand-in-hand with improvements
in communicative ability. There can be little doubt that such
communicative abilities play an important role in extending
the cognitive reach of an agent community. Indeed, we can
view communication as a form of networking capability that
enables agents to ‘connect’ with a range of cognitively-relevant
resources. This applies as much to human agents as it does to
their synthetic counterparts. As noted by Merlin Donald [34],
when it comes to human language, “Individuals in possession
of reading, writing, and other visuographic skills...become
somewhat like computers with networking capabilities; they are
equipped to interface, to plug into whatever network becomes
available” (p. 311).
The communicative function of language is no doubt impor-
tant when it comes to future forms of machine intelligence.
But there is another view of language that is of potential
significance here. This view is sometimes referred to as the
supracommunicative view of language [35][36]. The general
idea, in this case, is that language plays a role in transforming
the cognitive capabilities of the language-wielding agent.
Echoes of this view are apparent in the work of the philosopher,
Daniel Dennett [37]. He suggests that our ontogenetic immer-
sion in a linguistic environment contributes to an effective
reorganization of the human cognitive economy, such that
the parallel-processing dynamics of the biological brain are
transformed into something that more closely resembles a
conventional (symbol-manipulating) computational machine.
Strikingly, Dennett proposes that some of the most distinctive
features of human cognition (including the phenomenon of
human consciousness) emerge as a result of our attempts to get
to grips with the linguistic domain. Inasmuch as we accept these
claims, it should be clear that a simple communicative view of
language is unlikely to do justice to the potential impact of the
Web on future forms of machine intelligence: by immersing
intelligent systems in a linguistically-rich environment, and by
forcing such systems to assimilate linguaform representations
deep into their cognitive processing routines, we potentially
endow machines with the sorts of abilities and insights that
only us language-using human agents are able to grasp.
VI. CHILD MACHINES
David: Big things have small beginnings.
—Prometheus, 20th Century Fox, 2012
In the Introduction to this paper (see Section I) we en-
countered the idea that issues of social embedding and social
interaction play a crucial role in the development of human
cognitive capabilities. Such claims are relevant to the present
discussion in the sense that we can think of the Web as
enabling human agents to participate in the socially-mediated
development of machine-based cognitive capabilities. However,
in considering the ways in which the Web can be used to
scaffold and support the cognitive development of intelligent
systems, it is easy to overlook the fact that human infants are
not born with the same sorts of cognitive resources as their
adult counterparts. It is here that we encounter a productive
point of contact with work that shows how maturational shifts
in cognitive, sensory and motor capabilities may be of crucial
relevance to the emergence of advanced forms of cognitive
competence [38]–[41]. Such ideas are typically encountered in
the context of human language learning. Bjorklund [40], for
example, suggests that by imposing constraints on the kinds of
information that can be processed, maturational mechanisms
can be seen as supporting the progressive reshaping of the
‘effective’ structure of a human infant’s linguistic environment,
transforming what might seem like an impossible language
learning task into something a little more congenial. Similar
ideas can be found in more recent work in developmental
robotics [38][41]. Go´mez et al. [38], for example, describe
an intriguing set of results concerning the development of
sensorimotor capabilities in a real-world robotic system. They
report that a developmental profile characterized by progressive
increments in the complexity of sensory, motor and neurocom-
putational subsystems results in a profile of task performance
that is superior to that of a robot in which the relevant
maturational processes are disabled. Commenting on this
developmentally-grounded dissociation in ‘adult’ performance
profiles, they suggest that:
...rather than being a problem, early morphological
and cognitive limitations effectively decrease the
amount of information that infants have to deal with,
and may lead to an increase in the overall adaptivity
of the organism. [38, p. 119]
Such findings intimate at the potential relevance of matu-
rational parameters in the acquisition of advanced forms of
cognitive competence. In particular, they suggest that various
forms of cognitive immaturity may be of adaptive value in terms
of a system’s ability to achieve the sorts of cognitive success
that mark the end of the developmental process (see [42]).
What implications do these insights have for our understand-
ing of machine intelligence? In answering this question, it helps
to consider the notion of incremental learning [43]. Incremental
learning, as defined by Lungarella and Berthouze [41], is
the “idea of some learning-related resource (e.g., memory,
or attention span), starting at a low value, which then gradually
increases while (but not necessarily because) the organism
matures” (p. 1). In essence, the claim is that in our attempts
to yield advanced forms of machine intelligence, we should
attempt to emulate the developmental profile of human in-
fants. We should, in other words, seek to create what Alan
Turing [44] once referred to as “child machines”—machines
whose cognitively-relevant processing capabilities emerge as
the result of a particular form of artificial ontogenesis.
In the context of the present discussion, the notion of
incremental learning helps to reveal an important research
opportunity. This relates to the extent to which maturational
shifts in computational parameters can assist with the task
of pressing maximal cognitive benefit from Web-based forms
of informational contact with the human social environment.
There are a number of ways in which we might seek to
explore this dynamic dovetailing of intrinsic information
processing capabilities with the structure of the relevant learning
environment. One possibility is for a machine learning system
to exert some degree of control over the sorts of scaffolding
that are supplied by the human social environment, in the
manner, perhaps, of the active learning system described
by Barrington et al. [26]. Alternatively, a system could be
configured so as to process inputs of increasing complexity
as learning progresses. One way of accomplishing this is to
manipulate the computational and representational resources
that are available to the system as it attempts to learn about a
particular domain. Elman [39] provides a nice demonstration
of this sort of intervention. By altering the configuration of
a neural network, Elman was able to introduce a processing
constraint that limited the network’s ability to process complex
natural language sentences. As a result of this limitation, the
network was able to achieve a level of ‘linguistic’ performance
that was otherwise difficult to attain.
What is important, here, is not the details of how incremental
learning could be could be implemented by a machine learning
system. Instead, what is important is that we appreciate the role
of maturational processes in shaping the course of cognitive
development. In the absence of such an awareness, it might
be all too easy to think that only advanced forms of machine
intelligence are able to benefit from the sorts of contact the
Web provides with the human social environment, and this is
especially so once we consider the complexity of the digital
traces that mark our occasional forays into the online world.
There is thus a danger that our reasoning becomes somewhat
circular: only advanced forms of machine intelligence are able
to press maximal cognitive benefit from the Web, and only
machines that press maximal cognitive benefit from the Web
are able to exhibit advanced intelligence. In this sense, the
notion of incremental learning serves a useful prophylactic
purpose: it helps to remind us that big things often have small
beginnings. Indeed, it is perhaps by virtue of being small that
certain kinds of big thing are ever able to exist.
VII. THE ENGINEERS
Elizabeth Shaw: We call them Engineers.
Fifield: Engineers? Do you mind, um, telling us what they
engineered?
—Prometheus, 20th Century Fox, 2012
One of the characteristic features of the Social Web is that
everyone can contribute to it: every time we edit a Wikipedia
article, write a blog, or post a tweet, we are, in some sense,
contributing to the totality of information that is available on
the Web. This feature is, of course, so well-established as to
be hardly worth mentioning. And yet the idea that the online
environment emerges as a result of human contributions is an
important one. In particular, inasmuch as we see the Web as
a form of environment or ecology (see [1]), then our creative
contributions to the online realm can perhaps be glossed as
a form of ecological engineering. This helps to establish an
interesting point of contact with work that goes under the
heading of niche construction. Niche construction is a term
used by evolutionary biologists to refer to the ways in which
animals actively engineer their local environments (niches) so
as to alter the sorts of selective pressure that apply to future
generations [45]. The idea is relevant to the present discussion,
because the notion of niche construction has been implicated
in the evolutionary emergence of human intelligence [46]. The
full details of this proposal need not detain us here; the main
point, for present purposes, is simply the idea that humans
have the potential to engineer their environments in ways that
alter the evolutionary trajectory of future generations.
Issues of ecological engineering and niche construction
are important when we consider the potential role of the
Web in supporting the emergence of future forms of machine
intelligence. Thus just as progressive alterations in the structure
of the physical and social environment may help to establish
the conditions that favor the evolutionary emergence of human
intelligence (see [46]), so too, perhaps, our current forms of
interaction and engagement with the Web can be seen to yield
an ecological niche that is conducive to the emergence of
advanced (perhaps human-like) forms of machine intelligence.
As a means of helping us get a better grip on what is
being proposed here, it may help to focus our attention on
the way in which the Global Positioning System (GPS) has
contributed to the emergence of spatially-aware autonomous
systems. The constant stream of data provided by GPS satellites
has obviously impacted the way in which we humans navigate
and locate ourselves in space. But it should also be clear
that the very same system has had a significant impact on
the development of a rich array of intelligent systems. The
availability of GPS signals has thus transformed the kinds of
approach that can be adopted with respect to the implementation
of (e.g.) driverless cars and pilotless drones, enabling forms
of navigational competence that may have been difficult, if
not impossible, to achieve in the absence of such a suitably
structured environment. Crucially, once we focus our attention
on the sorts of capabilities that are exhibited by driverless
cars and pilotless drones, the ‘cognitive’ relevance of the
environment in which such systems are embedded starts
to come into clearer view. Absent the constant stream of
data provided by GPS satellites and the complexity of the
navigational problem may become so severe as to stymie our
best attempts at automation. The moral to emerge from all
this is that we should not underestimate the transformative
potential of an appropriately configured and suitably enriched
environment. When it comes to issues of machine intelligence,
the ability to engage in various forms of intelligent response
may have as much to do with the environment in which a
system is embedded as it does with the sophistication of the
system’s inner information processing mechanisms.
We can clearly think of GPS signals as establishing a
particular kind of digital data ecology—one that has proved to
be of value when it comes to the implementation of certain
kinds of intelligent system. But much the same could be said
of the digital data ecology that we encounter in the case of
the Web. Consider, for example, one of the key exemplars
of the emerging cognitive computing paradigm: IBM Watson.
Watson’s virtuoso performance in answering an array of difficult
questions is undoubtedly an important demonstration of the
growing sophistication of Artificial Intelligence (AI) algorithms,
especially in the areas of natural language processing, machine
learning and domain-specific reasoning. But, in the course
of being awestruck by (at least some of) Watson’s outputs,
it is easy to overlook the simple fact that many of the
inputs to the system—especially the information resources
that Watson exploits in supplying its human interlocutors with
answers—are ones that are, in general, developed by large
numbers of human individuals. Such resources include online
encyclopedias, dictionaries, thesauri, taxonomies, ontologies
and so on [47]. None of these resources, it should be clear, were
specifically intended to support Watson, or indeed any of the
other cognitive computing systems that are the focus of current
research efforts. Nevertheless, such resources play a crucial
role in enabling Watson to exhibit capabilities that surpass
those of the average human individual. Perhaps if Watson had
emerged in an earlier era, we would have been astounded by
its question/answering capabilities. And yet Watson is, at root,
exactly the same kind of symbol manipulating machine that
has long been the focus of philosophical theorizing and the
primary instrument of cognitive scientific practice. Arguably,
what has changed in recent times is not so much the underlying
technologies as the nature of the environment in which such
technologies are situated. The emergence of the Web has thus
yielded an environment that has altered the ‘evolutionary’
landscape for intelligent systems. It is an environment that
we humans have created, and it is one that we will bequeath
to our biological progeny. But perhaps this particular form of
niche construction is unlike those that preceded it. Perhaps it
is no longer just the cognitive destiny of our own species that
is affected by our attempts to create, configure and construct
the informational ecology of the online digital world.
VIII. CONCLUSION
On the basis of the foregoing analysis, we are in a position
to identify a number of ways in which the Web can be seen
to provide access to the human social environment. One kind
of access is captured by the notion of the human cloud (see
Section II). In this case, we saw how the Web could be used
to ‘recruit’ human agents into complex information processing
tasks. A similar idea emerged in the discussion of active
learning (see Section IV). Here, we saw how machine learning
systems could actively shape their learning trajectories by
soliciting particular kinds of input from the human social
environment. Finally, in Section III, we saw how human
contributions to the online environment could support the
processes of social learning and experiential knowledge mining.
In addition to outlining the ways in which the Web provides
access to the human social environment, the present paper also
highlights a number of areas for future research. For example,
in Section V, we touched on the idea that language has a
supracommunicative function, helping to promote productive
shifts in the cognitive capabilities of language-wielding agents.
We also encountered the idea that maturational shifts in
cognitively-relevant parameters may play a crucial role in
enabling an intelligent system to acquire certain kinds of
cognitive and behavioral competence (see Section VI). Such
insights are relevant to the development of intelligent systems
that are able to press maximal cognitive benefit from their
contact with the human social environment.
The advent of the (Social) Web marks a potentially significant
milestone in the development of advanced forms of machine
intelligence. Traditionally, issues of social embedding, social
interaction and enculturation have been discussed in relation
to human intelligence. It is thus the nature of our contact with
the human social environment that has been seen to underlie
the kinds of cognitive capabilities that are the hallmark of our
species. Prior to the advent of the Web, the opportunities for
machines to be embedded within the human social environment
were somewhat limited. Now, in an era where a significant
proportion of humanity engages with the Web on a more-or-
less daily basis, it is increasingly difficult for online forms
of machine intelligence to ignore the vagaries of the social
world. Inasmuch as we accept that human intelligence emerges
as the result of our attempt to navigate the complexities of
the social realm, then perhaps the online environment is the
perfect place to look for machines whose capabilities enable
them to reach those parts of the cognitive terrain that only our
(human) minds are able to call their home.
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